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1

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH

SALT LAKE CITY,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Appeal No. 920478-CA
Priority No. 2

MAUREEN MCGUIRE,
Defendant/Appellant.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Rule
26(2)(a) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(d)(1953 as amended), whereby the defendant in a circuit
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals
from a final order on a misdemeanor offense, whether it is a
conviction or a plea.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1.

Was the evidence sufficient to sustain Appellant's

conviction for Telephone Harassment?

STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Salt Lake City Code § 11-08-030
A.

A person is guilty of Telephone Harassment if, with

intent to annoy or alarm another, he/she:
1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a
conversation ensues, without purpose or lawful
communication, including but not limited to making a
call or calls and then terminating the call before
conversation ensues; or
2.

Makes repeated, unwanted telephone calls at

extremely inconvenient hours; or
3.

Insults, taunts, or challenges another by use of

telephone communication in a manner likely to provoke
a violent or disorderly response; or
4.

Telephones another and knowingly makes any false

statements concerning injury, death, disfigurement,
indecent conduct or criminal conduct of the person
telephones or any member of his/her family, or uses
obscene, profane, or threatening language with intent
to terrify, intimidate, harass or annoy.

The making

of a false statement as herein set out shall be prima
facie evidence of intent to terrify, intimidate,
harass or annoy.
B.

Telephone Harassment is a Class B. misdemeanor.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On July 7, 1992, Appellant was convicted, by the Honorable
Michael L. Hutchings of Telephone Harassment, a Class B misdemeanor,
in violation of Salt Lake City Code § 11-08-030 (T. 34). The court
sentenced her to have no contact with the victim; attend an anger
management course with proof to the court by
November 1, 1992; attend mental health counseling with proof to the
court by November 1, 1992; and 180 days in jail, 175 of which was
suspended with the remaining 5 days to be completed by performing
community in lieu of jail by November 1, 1992.

This sentence was

stayed pending the outcome of this appeal.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Peggy Sue Taylor Patterson, an acquaintance of Appellant's
mother, testified that on December 28, 1991, at approximately 10:31
p.m., the first in a series of harassing phone calls was received at
her home (T. 1 ) . This first phone call was answered by Mrs.
Taylor's four-year-old daughter (T. 2,13).

She did not talk to the

person on the other end of the phone, but did talk to the individual
when later calls were received (T. 3 ) .
A series of seven calls were received between 10:31 p.m. and
11:53 p.m. December 28, 1991 (Addendum A Page 1 ) . Mrs. Taylor
contacted the police, and upon arriving at her home, allegedly heard
a voice on the other end.
identified.

The individual on the other end was not

These calls were received between 12:01 a.m. and 12:15

a.m. on December 29, 1991 (T. 4-5). Recommendations from police
-3 -

dispatch and the officer, to Mrs. Taylor consisted of keeping track
of the calls made and the time they were received (T. 5-6). She
kept track of these calls by writing the times calls were received
and what was said (T. 6). This log was admitted at trial for the
limited purpose that calls were received not for the identification
of who made the calls (T. 6, Addendum A Page 1).
Mrs. Taylor testified she knew the Appellant for two to three
years (T. 7-8). She had never talked to the Appellant except for
twelve brief conversations over the phone when she (Mrs. Taylor)
attempted to call Appellant's mother (T. 9,10).

This was over the

course of two years and were two minutes in length at the most (T.
11).

The calls in question received by Mrs. Taylor on December 28

and 29 of 1991, were much shorter in duration than earlier calls
between Appellant and Mrs. Taylor (T. 12). Although the calls in
question were much shorter in duration, Mrs. Taylor testified she
felt it was Appellant's voice she heard on the other end of the
phone, except for one call received at 12:01 p.m. December 29, 1991,
which was from Lisa Larsen (T. 5,9,12).

Even with Mrs. Taylor's

alleged identification, she was not able to state how she knew this
was Appellant's voice (T. 10). There was not one distinction or one
characteristic that could be explained (T. 10).
James Richard Butters, Mrs. Taylor's husband, testified that he
was home when the calls were received (T. 13). He claimed the voice
he heard when he answered the phone at 11:51 p.m. on December 28,
1991, was the Appellant's (T. 14). Mr. Butters claimed to be a
long-time friend of the family and has spoken to Appellant at least
-4 -

ten times on the telephone over the course of twenty years (T. 15).
When asked to describe any characteristics that would make
Appellant's voice immediately identifiable, Mr. Butters could not
name one (T. 16).
Lisa Larson, Appellant's niece, testified that she made one
phone call to Mrs. Taylor's home December 29, 1991 at approximately
noon (T. 18-19, Addendum p.l).

This call was made at the request of

Appellant because Miss Larson knew the phone number, and because
Appellant was upset because police officers were sent to her home by
Mrs. Taylor the night before.(T. 17,22).
Jamie Masterson, Appellant's fourteen-year-old daughter,
testified that she was home with her cousin and Appellant December
28, 1991 (T. 27). While she was playing with her cousin, she saw
Appellant make one phone call which ended with Appellant singing
into the phone (T. 28). That was the only phone call she saw
Appellant make and Appellant was in the same room with Miss
Masterson all night (T. 29). This call was made before police
officers arrived at her home (T. 28-29).

After the officers left,

Miss Masterson and her cousin discussed the incident and ate some
food (T. 29). During that period of time, there were no phone calls
made by Appellant (T. 29).
Appellant testified she made two phone calls between 10:30 p.m.
and midnight December 28, 1991 (T. 21). These were calls to a
friend who was not home, and after the answering machine came on,
she sang a song into the phone (T. 21). Appellant admitted that on
December 29, 1991, she asked Lisa Larson to make the one and only
call to Mrs. Taylor (T. 22,25).
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According to Appellant's testimony, she and Mrs. Taylor have
talked on the phone twenty or twenty-four times (T. 24). Appellant
also stated that she had not met Mr. Butters and had not had any
telephone conversations with him (T. 25).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Contrary to the court's conclusion, there was no other
evidence linking Appellant to the telephone calls except the one
call made by Lisa Larson for Appellant.

Prior familiarity with

Appellant's voice was insufficient inasmuch as there were no
particular characteristics that could be linked to Appellant's voice
and there were no lengthy conversations between Appellant and Mrs.
Taylor and Mr. Butters.

Because there was insufficient evidence of

Appellant's guilt, this court should reverse her conviction and bar
her retrial.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT
Appellant was convicted of Telephone Harassment, defined by
Salt Lake City Code § 11-08-030 as follows:
A.

A person is guilty of Telephone Harassment if, with

intent to annoy or alarm another, he/she:
1. Makes a telephone call, whether or not a
conversation ensues, without purpose or lawful
communication, including but not limited to making a
call or calls and then terminating the call before
conversation ensues; or
2.

Makes repeated, unwanted telephone calls at

extremely inconvenient hours; or
3.

Insults, taunts, or challenges another by use of

telephone communication in a manner likely to provoke
a violent or disorderly response; or
4.

Telephones another and knowingly makes any false

statements concerning injury, death, disfigurement,
indecent conduct or criminal conduct of the person
telephones or any member of his/her family, or uses
obscene, profane, or threatening language with intent
to terrify, intimidate, harass or annoy.

The making

of a false statement as herein set out shall be prima
facie evidence of intent to terrify, intimidate,
harass or annoy.
B.

Telephone Harassment is a Class B. misdemeanor.

Inasmuch as Appellant's case was tried to the bench, the
standard of review discussed in State v. Wright, 744 P.2d 315 (Utah
App. 1987) applies.

As this court explained in that opinion,

"[I]f the findings, (or the trial court's verdict
in a criminal case) are against the clear weight of
the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a
mistake has been made, the findings (or verdict)
will be set aside." [State v.3 Walker, 743 P.2d
[191,] 193 [(Utah 1987)]. Application of this new
standard does not eliminate the traditional
deference afforded the factfinder to determine the
credibility of the witnesses.
Wright at 317. Review of the Court's assessment of the evidence in
this case in light of the record of the trial must lead to the
conclusion that the city failed to prove Appellant guilty of
Telephone Harassment.
The Court's ruling was as follows:
After hearing the evidence in the case, I find the
defendant guilty of the offense. I'm convinced of guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt. I'm finding that the calls
were made by the defendant. The witnesses that testified
for the prosecution stated they could recognize the voice
of the defendant. There has been some history between
them of bad blood, bad feelings. I'm finding that they
spoke on the phone on enough occasions to where they could
identify the voice that was there. I'm also persuaded by
the testimony of Miss Larson about the event that took
place the next day. Again, a phone call was initiated by
the defendant through the mechanism or means of having
Miss Larson make the phone call. Now it is close enough
in time and I'm finding that, and concluding I just don't
have a reasonable doubt as to the identity of the person
that made the phone calls. Clearly the phone calls were
harassing and in violation of the city ordinance and for
those reasons I find the defendant guilty of the offense.
(T. 34-35).
The trial court's assessment of the evidence was improper
because the only consideration given to any of the evidence was a
-8 -

call made the following day for Appellant, and the alleged
conversations between Mrs. Taylor, Mr. Butters, and Appellant the
night the calls were made.
In rejecting Appellant's version of the circumstances
surrounding the calls, the trial court discounted the credibility of
the one witness who was with Appellant the night the calls were
made, Jamie Masterson.

Miss Masterson testified that she observed

Appellant make a phone call after which Appellant sang into the
phone (T. 28). After that point, she did not see Appellant make any
other calls (T. 29). The fact that she is Appellant's daughter is a
bias, but certainly not enough to lie about the number of phone
calls that Appellant made.
When voice identification is the only evidence presented, that
identification alone cannot support a conviction unless there is
shown (1) prior familiarity with the voice of the identified person
or, (2) some peculiarity of the person's voice that makes it readily
identifiable, State v. Booker, 709 P.2d 342, 345 (Utah 1985) (citing
State v. Karas, 136 P. 788 (Utah 1913)).

In the present case,

Mrs. Taylor stated she had known Appellant for two to three years,
but had only talked with her twelve times on the telephone (T. 10).
Even then, the length of the conversation was no more than two
minutes (T. 11). Although the length of the calls made was not
determined, Mrs. Taylor also stated they were much shorter than two
minutes (T.12).

Mr. Butters also stated he had spoken with

Appellant ten times over the course of twenty years (T.15).

Twelve

phone calls over the course of three years, which were no more than
two minutes in length is not enough to develop familiarity with the
voice of the identified person.

Mrs. Taylor and Mr. Butters could not identify any
characteristics of the voice heard on the phone (T. 10,16).

Voice

identification alone is considered insufficient to support a
conviction unless shown to be especially reliable. State v. Karas,
136 P. at 490.

If there had been other evidence, even

circumstantial, that would contribute to the voice identification it
would provide a sufficient evidentiary basis to support the
decision.

In this case, there was no circumstantial evidence.

State v. Kilpatrick, 173 P.2d 284, at 285 (Utah 1946).

See

There also

were no clear facts to show identity and no personal identification
by the caller.

Clearly there were not enough evidence from which to

draw an inference that Appellant was the caller.

See State v.

Nickles, 723 P.2d 123, 128-129 (Utah 1986).
In resting Appellantfs conviction on the strength of the
identification, the trial court ruled against the clear weight of
the evidence.

CONCLUSION
Because the Court's findings were against the clear weight of
the evidence, this Court should reverse Appellant's conviction,
declaring her innocent as a matter of law. State v. Murphy, 617 P.2d
399, 403 (Utah 1980).

Respectfully submitted this

/*

day of December, 1992.
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
I, LESHIA LEE-DIXON, hereby certify that I have caused eight
copies of the foregoing to be delivered to the Utah Court of
Appeals, 400 Midtown Plaza, 230 South 500 East, Salt Lake City, Utah
84102, and two copies to the City Prosecutor's Office, 451 South 200
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this

/ff

day of

December, 1992.

EESHIA LEE-DIXON

DELIVERED/MAILED this

/?

day of December, 1992.
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